Science, for example, endeavors to discover the laws of nature, but are they really laws or just random events that appear to be like laws? Since we don’t really know, there is an interpretation of what is really going on, and the transaction is a value relative to the interpretation.
The Vienna School said knowing something reduces to real, measurable value under the circumstances. If something stays the same under changing circumstances (under transformation), scientists say it has symmetry, acting like a natural law. What causes a transformation may appear to be random (having no purpose), but if certain, integral values maintain, nevertheless, we call it the truth–something that does not change (like the abstract world of Plato’s ideas). Inertia, for example, is a measurable concept, but the events that demonstrate the value of inertia can appear to be random, or unknown (having been caused without purpose). The available ambiguity has an arguable ambivalence, or a relative value that is open to Transactional Interpretation (giving creative cause to the purpose), which is (effectively) an attributive value.
(Other articles on attributive value by griffithlighton can be found on the World Wide Web.)
In the world of political-economy, the random interpretation of objective reality occupies the space of every argument. Science is the preferred method of knowing things but, like the Vienna School found out, it still tends to reduce to a philosophical discussion about the way things should be as opposed to the way things just naturally are and thus can’t be changed–not without causing a lot of problems for ourselves, anyway, which are then described as unintended consequences.
Unintended consequences are the realm of Available Ambiguity and the Arguable Ambivalence of objective reality. When Bank of America and Goldman Sachs say that circumstances force them to “naturally” take a course of action that is harmful to a lot of people, they are saying they do not ultimately control the circumstances. (This is what Lloyd Blankfein meant when he told Congressman Levin that when Goldman Sachs sold derivative devices that led to the Great Recession, it was “doing God’s work.” He said it was a joke, but what he means is that it is a paradoxical truth that Objectivists describe as an unemotional, objective reality.) Essentially, it is a random interpretation of the relative value, and the argument is “made” to exculpate the risk, arguing the ambiguity of the liability, transacting the ambivalence that is described as random events that really (objectively) have no purpose. This means that the cause has no intended identity, despite that Bank of America and Goldman Sachs admit they exist to make money.
Admission of intent, and being measured against the results, would seem to settle the ambiguity; but no, there is an arguable ambivalence, described as an emergent property.
What emerges from unmitigated greed (what psychologists call Empathy Deficit Disorder) is the utility of a higher, macro-economic efficiency (that just sort of happens). We have a glut of an essential input–oil, for example, don’t we? Doesn’t everybody benefit equally from falling energy prices, which is to measure its success, or utility?
Naturally, we are possessed by the numbers. In the macro (gamma-risk) dimension, in the realm of large numbers (which defines the utility of the argument), anything is possible, having cause without purpose; and that is the utility of objective reality (naturally existing without empathy), existing with a relative, random interpretation, creating the argument to resolve the ambiguity on demand, isn’t it?
Remember now, TBTF banks drove oil prices to the point of financial default using derivative devices, which are mechanical, Empathy Deficit Devices (EDD’s) regulated by the CFTC and Dodd-Frank to keep it all in order; and here we are, once again, trying to divine the risk associated with having too much of a good thing (classic overproduction) in a crisis proportion. It is so “irrational” that a random attribution can be the only interpretation available to explain the ambivalence, which just happens to be the ambiguity available to exculpate the liability associated with deliberate application of the risk (the “ratio” of income distribution) in a TBTF (gamma-risk) dimension.
When considering the probable risk, with the natural utility of large numbers (the current rate of income distribution), what is the real rate of repossession to be expected on demand?
When it “just happens” it may emerge spontaneous but not at all random, disconnected, or alienated from objective reality.