TBTF banks have billions of dollars in reserves to cover loans made to bring the price of oil down. Whether the actual reserve amounts will really cover the default risk is an approximation, which forms an arbitrage argument. The argument has a differential metric that resolves in derivative markets, yielding to the default-risk premium.
(Keep in mind here, again, it looks like the risk is being determined by market forces, but it’s not really like the tide that raises all boats. Instead of being determined by the risk, the risk is being determined. When it comes to the liability, the “determination” is critical to knowing what the “limited liability” actually is. Capitalists say it is limited by nature. Nevertheless, forming an arbitrage argument, yielding to the default-risk premium, what is the real determination of the risk? “When” you know “why” it is going to happen, keep in mind, the liability is fully charged–to the limit!)
If the capital reserves really measure the amount of oil in storage (in surplus), the surplus value is trillions of dollars. The rate of profit naturally declines.
What does that mean to you?
The result is classic overproduction. “When” that happens you need to know “why” but explaining why in classical terms means you are “a communist or something.”
The classic explanation, however, is the same mathematical association used to measure, for example, capital reserves required to cover the risk of financial default. (When did capitalism go communist?) The difference is whether you think financial default is an unavoidable, natural condition, accepted as the harm that will be done, which just happens to yield the default risk premium, contractually obligated, and paid on demand, in derivative markets (which is so “arcane” that the liability associated with it–whether it is right or wrong–is too ambiguous to actually be measured).
Surplus value naturally associates with unemployment and a declining rate of profit. (A naturally declining rate of profit associates with not being able to pay it.) Oil production workers are going to feel the Bern, and it doesn’t stop there. It has a multiplier effect. Firms default and consolidate (to resist the declining rate of profit) under deflationary pressure.
Consolidation supports prices. “When” prices “recover” there is an inflationary trend with unemployment. That’s when “the why” comes into focus, and overvalued celebrity analysts get an object lesson on what it really means to “Feel the Bern” without actually knowing it.
Boardroom analytics, scripted to associate with the master’s identity, is the common faire of mainstream media. It is so heavy handed that the mainstream is less and less popular to know why things happen. Hearing about what happened when it happens is then a phenomenology–edited to create an image of objective reality that leads the target to believe in the master’s “natural identity.”
Identity is an associative property. People aren’t stupid. They know when the values are disassociative, and just like in nature, the values naturally align to form an emergent property.
In the case of oil, the derivative value (the emergent property) is the surplus. How it is valued is open to interpretation. Nevertheless, like any classical economist will tell you, there is a natural identity associated with it that determines its natural existence (or what Kant described as the obliging symmetry of the categorical imperative).
What happens (categorically) when, for example, the storage capacity runs out?
(Feel the Bern, maybe?)
What, then, is the real value of being required to hold really big capital reserves?
(What is the real value–the property–to be actualized, emerging on demand?)