Cameron Assesses the Risk

British Prime Minister, David Cameron said today that the UK has “ten times more capital in reserve than it had before the financial crisis.”

Notice the measurable, moral comparative that assesses the determination of the risk. It is a Transactional Interpretation that defines the perception of what the objective is, which then determines the course of action (cause and effect), reacting to the determination of the risk.

Notice the tendency, yielding to objective reality, intending to manage the risk so that it reduces its naturally random attribution. Reducing how random the risk appears to be, however, does not actually reduce the risk, but shifts it (transacts it), converging all the economic metrics (all the directional indicators) into another dimension, occupying a political space (the gamma-risk dimension).

There was a lot of serious discussion about raising capital reserves because it is deflationary, and so we have the “long-tail recovery” (measuring the gamma risk). Operating in a TBTF dimension, raising the reserve “requirement” is necessary (the risk tautology, demonstrating the irreducible risk, fully assumed in priority, which is to always know its real value–the moral hazard–now in all the futures, thus being obliged to it, which is a political consideration).

Notice the tendency to the DJIX-17k sell signal, which (like I’ve been telling you) indicates what the real resistance is (which I describe as the retributive value in the gamma-risk dimension). This is an attributive value: Its value can be attributed to toxic “assets” producing risk-value (referred to as the credit-risk premium, which resulted from knowing the value of the so-called non-systemic, concentration risk).

Equity indices are, right now, for example, below decisive daily moving averages. (Below the 200 day, for example, which indicates the probable strength of the trend). Can that value be attributed to Brexit, or is Brexit just a catalyst–a trigger to call the margin (being then the attributive-risk-value), which is when dealer-brokers start selling your assets by default due to unexpected circumstances (?) contractually obligated on demand.

The result is confiscation of property.

Is that really unintended?

Cameron said he did not intend Brexit to pass. It was unexpected, he said, and in that case he was looking for the empirical value (the legitimate, logical utility) of the popular vote to direct the probable risk, which is then its attributive (exculpatory) value on demand.

(Again, remember what I was telling you about bank stocks. They are getting hit hard by Brexit because, you see, what are they really worth? There are a lot of hidden risks in the form of derivative value–swaps!)

Remember that TBTF banks did a big swap with central banks, like the Fed, to keep them from failing. TBTF banks own trillions of dollars in toxic debt and swapped it for capital reserves, methodically yielding deflationary “assets.” So, is this the zero-hedge effect? Is this not causing the risk by trying to avoid it? Does this not accumulate errors into the futures, rendering a retributive value that exists now with a positive attribution called credit-risk protection?

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About griffithlighton

musician-composer, artist, writer, philosopher and political economist (M.A.)
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