Avoiding the Eventuality

In the world of arbitrage, the practitioner knows the eventuality can be avoided now but not in the futures. The risk of loss is fully assumed in priority.

It would not appear that the world of arbitrage intersects with the realm of philosophy. Hobbes, for example, told the king his power is subjected to the consent of the governed. It is not a matter of choice. It is a natural law–having symmetry under transformation (CPT-symmetry). In other words, the value of governance has natural equivalence that gains the event probability (ECV-symmetry), realizing the risk, yielding the natural-right to occupy the space known as the legitimate force of legal-and-proper authority.

Of course, if power derives from the realm of the supernatural, like the divine-right of the monarch, the event horizon (the Hobbesian choice of divine right, which is naturally not a choice at all) is unlimited. The king’s choice, however, is naturally limited to the force and legitimacy of proper authority, which happens to be its natural-law identity. There is no agnostic play, here, just the gaining event probability you did not think possible.

Whoever would be king has the same event horizon, majority rule or not. The coercive value is symmetrical, and like the arbitrageur knows very well, it is a distributive property that can be avoided now but not in all the futures.

The probable event is always naturally determined, and like Kant said, everybody, even the wannabe king, is obligated to it.

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About griffithlighton

musician-composer, artist, writer, philosopher and political economist (M.A.)
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