Macro Motives

Since structural incentives are likely determinants, analyses tend to model the structure. However, ideologically, there are various interpretations to abstract objective reality and transact how the risk (the fully assumed loss) plays out. This transactional interpretation forms a macro structure of determination that is both intended and unintended.

The extent of determinism is the realm of philosophical discussion. It is especially salient when considering the proportion of intended and unintended risk, the liability associated with the bad things that will surely happen, and when (and if) it just happens by default.

The acquisition of 21st Century Fox by Disney, for example, encounters the discussion of what motivates the action being taken.

Parties to the Fox-Disney transaction want us to believe that M&A occurs, naturally, to benefit consumers; but the more likely determinant is that it “naturally intends” to benefit shareholders at the expense of consumers. (See other articles by griffithlighton on “the intendency.”)

The bottom 90% of US households hold a small fraction of equity shares and only about 28% of aggregate net worth. Doing the math, and empirically experiencing the macro dimension of real net worth, the measurable difference naturally transacts an interpretation of the outcome. Typically, the color of the interpretation takes the shape of natural-risk modeling, using abstract terms like “natural identity” and “objective reality.”

Since capitalists argue that the self-interest of consumers and shareholders are naturally aligned and mutually beneficial, the discussion is over until all the bad things happen. The bad that derives from intending to do the good typically takes the form of inflation and unemployment, which is then blamed on too much government regulation and the over-reach of the “deep state” — forming the color and shape of a transactional interpretation.

The motive to regulate the probability of doing harm to the greater good then enters the argument. It is the realm of bureaucratic authority, and conservatives argue that it ends the reign of liberalism, bringing back the notion of sovereign power (intending the king, empowered with the Social Contract) to arbitrarily decide what everybody’s best interest is.

The so-called “deep-state” Leviathan is modeled to mitigate the probable risk. Not to protect the public, really, however, but to protect capitalists from themselves.

Thus we have the “in-tending” bureaucratic model of power and political economy. It is an analytical model to predict probable motives that affect the intended probability of the fully assumed risk; and for financiers it is all about knowing how the incentives are structured (by buiding-out an economy of scale, or “organizing the externalities”) to predict (i.e., predetermine) when it will occur.

If you can determine when bad things “just happen” and not if they happen by default, what is the liability? This is a point of intense philosophical discussion and much of what I write about involves the random self-assembly of structural determination, crossed with the notion of self-determination (or “the intendency”).

If “We The People” are naturally Sovereign, instead of intending the end of liberalism, “We” naturally tend to make it “just happen” by default. The formation of the bureaucratic model intends to verify that, with a deepening geometric progression, by natural design.

Key to its determination is the color of the interpretation, which shapes the motive, and forms the abstract, of “objective reality.”

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Deregulation of the Internet

The FCC moved to deregulate the internet marketplace, eliminating net neutrality by a 3-2 vote.

According to the FCC’s, Trump-appointed chairman, the move creates the incentive for innovative investment.

Don’t be fooled by the language used to justify eliminating neutrality.

Conservatives say that deregulation opens up the market. It makes the market more free to innovate. Net neutrality, however, did nothing to inhibit free-market innovation.

Instead of actually deregulating the marketplace, by means of bureaucratic authority, big corporate conglomerates will be regulating it to derive the highest price at the lowest possible cost. This means, characteristic of big-corporate conglomeration in the name of free-market efficiency, the price goes up and the quality goes down for everybody!

Sorry, Mr. President, but that’s not an improvement!

Well, there it is, Mr. President… the “deep state” in operation at your behest… and it is deeply flawed!

Your administrative adjunct at the FCC traded a government reg for a private-sector reg that will reduce the incentive to innovate.

Bad move! This shows extreme incompetence at the highest level of business and commerce combined with the bureaucratic model of power.

What’s the incentive?

I wrote the FCC when eliminating net neutrality was first proposed in the name of free marketeering.

If the incentive is to, for example, reduce scarcity of resources, there is no incentive for big-corporate conglomerates to increase the supply. Instead, as usual (contrary to the free-market incentive), they will reduce demand by differentiating the price. It starts to look more like a command economy (rationing by means of consolidated authority) than a free market.

Consolidating industry and markets to make it more like a free market is just simply absurd; and if you, Mr. President, and your deep-state adjuncts, think that’s how a free market really works in the public interest, your administration of the state is deeply flawed!

Eliminating net neutrality has everything to do with the incentive to consolidate the media marketplace. It will result in less innovation at the highest possible cost.

What, then, pray tell, is the real incentive (the motive) for supporting the end of net neutrality?

“The End of Liberalism?”

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Creating Productive Incentive

Conservatives argue that hoarding labor, in the form of capital, creates productive incentive. The hoard is created by raising prices and reducing costs.

Not having the money you need to buy things makes you work more for less, and capitalists get upset when currency is defined as being more than just a means of transacting business. It means you might consider how managing the money supply is used to subordinate you, in the name of creating the things we all want and need, by means of deprivation.

Shortages are easily cured with rising prices, and capitalism is a sure way to cure what ails us, by making us sick, for our own good, of course.

Devising a system that mechanically makes you work more for less, with the natural legitimacy of existing on demand, is quite clever until the resistance naturally forms, emerging on demand, to claim the natural identity of the capital. Capitalists say it naturally belongs to them because they earn it, working real hard to get you working more for less, and charging you more for what you produce than you are paid. The discrepancy naturally forms a political-risk dimension (which I call the gamma-risk dimension). It can’t be avoided but can be organized, and periodically reformed, into an accumulative-risk dimension with a naturally imperative value.

Operating in a short-term dimension, capitalists tend to ignore the accumulative (gamma-risk) dimension. It is just an abstraction — an arbitrary existence, Objectivists say — that distorts the natural identity of objective reality. At the core of what’s real is the power to raise prices at will, unsubordinated by market forces, which would mean that “the people” determine prices and not the captains of industry and finance, creating productive incentives on demand and not command.

Having command of the core dimension — determination of the price to be paid — is everything, and capitalists apply the risk (the real price to be paid) through inflation and unemployment. At the center of stabilizing the risk is central banking, like the Fed, operating to ensure low inflation at full employment, but without commanding prices, which is the sole propriety of businesses, privately enterprised to sell at the highest possible price at the lowest possible cost (inflation and unemployment).

At the core is the power — the authority — to raise prices, and core CPI data published today declined precipitously.

What’s the incentive to raise prices without pressure to demand it?

Food and energy prices are rising, however, because demand for these goods is relatively inelastic.

So, we have a deflationary trend excluding food and energy.

With the current, ongoing, deflationary trend, the incentive to raise interest rates, and return to normal, is being resisted. The resistance, not so ironically, is due to the Fed’s big accomplishment: unemployment below 5% with low inflation.

Since, however, the low inflation data is really an ongoing deflationary trend, monetarist management of the risk has an active contradiction to contend with. The contradiction takes the color and shape of “the 2% inflation target.”

While it is the Fed’s mission to have high employment with low inflation, monetarists are mysteriously stuck on a metric that contradicts their success.

Conservatives argue that if wages and salaries fall, employment rises, and that’s what we have now.

While we are back to a pre-crisis unemployment rate, the rate is at a lower labor cost. The number is much lower than before the financial crash that precipitated the Great Recession, and the natural result is a falling CPI, ex food and energy, like we have now, indicating an ongoing deflationary trend (a Great Recession) that conservatives say creates productive incentive on demand.

The incentive is to work more for less, which is what happens when the financial system is organized to periodically crash, which is then referred to as “systemic risk.”

Working more for less creates a surplus, and laissez-faire, classical economists called this “surplus value.” The surplus is stored, and portable, in the form of “the capital,” and managed using derivative, financial devices, using proprietary means deliberately designed to deflate labor value against rising prices. This means that demand for anything you don’t need is falling while what you do need is rising. Thus the metric referred to as core inflation.

Engineering the systemic risk (so that you work more for less) into a crisis proportion (yielding to the gamma-risk dimension) is to deliberately subordinate you. It is intended to deliberately defeat natural market forces that otherwise put you in control of creating the productive incentive, on demand, by default.

Financial risk to create productive incentive by depriving you of the means to demand the supply is nothing but the deliberate means of enslaving you.

Slavery, by any means, in the civilized world, is patently illegal because, instead of creating productive incentive, it creates the incentive for a non-passive resistance. It is a clear-and-present threat to public safety and welfare, and “We” are all smart enough to defeat that threat without violence, aggressing the passive resistance on demand, “to form a more perfect union” … “with liberty and justice for all!”

So, ask yourself, what is the real incentive, that actualizes on demand, no matter what?

Yielding to the always-present means of a passive resistance is only natural and, over time, whether deliberate or not, categorically imperative.

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The Rising Rate of Resistance

Senator Rand Paul says he will vote “no” on the current tax-reform bill.

There is a rising rate of resistance to the abstract value of a debt proportion so big it cannot possibly be paid.

The public debt is real, but the actual number is surreal since paying it will actually result in a declining rate of profit. If rich people buy the debt and then have to pay it with a progressive tax burden, the rate of return is negative.

It is no coincidence that the US, and other sovereign debtors, are struggling to counter the natural identity of a real, negative rate of return.

The real rate of resistance is rising, even among conservatives.

What’s the incentive, being created and emergent (adding identity), at the negative rate?

(See other articles, and images created by griffith lighton, on “the added identity.”)

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Creating the Incentive

Currency is a measure of useful value. People that want to reduce the discussion of currency to merely the incentive to create useful value, however, get upset when money is identified as being more than a means of portable exchange value that facilitates commerce. Objecting to it representing useful value suggests a Marxist analytic, and conservative ideologues want to be sure and avoid that.

Rather than merely a means of exchange, currency obviously indicates useful value. Health care prices are really high because just about everybody needs it, but since money is required to actually demand it, in a free market, the price “naturally” comes down. The natural decline also indicates useful value, resulting in a declining rate of profit.

Capitalists argue that a declining rate of profit results in going out of business. It is anti-productive. High profits are also counter-productive, however, with the seller going out of business due to insufficient funds, which is the measurable means to actually demand goods and services (currency).

Maintaining high profit margins naturally results in a declining rate of profit, measured by currencies, exchanged at the risk-free rate of return.

With the Great Recession, the value of the dollar has declined to a negative rate of real return. Since we are still trying to normalize the current rate, and create the incentive to invest long term, the Great Recession isn’t over.

To protect the accumulation of integral value (the capacity to actually demand goods and services with “currency”) from the fully assumed risk of loss, capitalists hide the risk-value in derivative financial products.

These derivative products were once considered to be racketeering schemes. That changed, however, when President Bill Clinton signed the Financial Reform and Modernization Act, and the Commodities, Futures, and Trade Modernization Act into law in 1999.

Bitcoin is currently a place to store the accumulated value. To protect current net worth from the risk of loss there is every incentive to create this form of currency. It derives from the declining rate of profit and naturally emerges in the form of a “bubble.”

In scientific terms, what we have here is the emergent property of a self-assembly, but it exists on demand.

The risk is not reduced. It is an integral value, existing in the futures now, on demand.

Disambiguation of the argument is naturally emergent, having the property of a self-assembly, derived from the means of our own devices, existing at current value.

(See other articles, and images created by griffith lighton, on the concept of the emergent property and the self-assembly.)

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Ambiguous Disambiguity

Consider the notion of right-wing populism.

Saying that tax cuts for big corporations is good for everybody is a populist expression, and conservative analysts tend to see it that way, but it is still an abstraction of objective reality. There is considerable ambiguity.

It is the Fed’s bureaucratic mission to maintain a stable monetary system, but it is still looking to “normalize” rates.

Since real rates have been negative, the Fed intends to disambiguate the risk associated with “the risk-free rate.”

You may have been taught that “the risk” is the probability of loss. At a negative rate, however, the loss is not a probability. To disambiguate the argument, and arbitrage the risk, it is necessary to normalize rates so that “risk free” actually means a real capital gain without fear of loss that is otherwise fully assumed in priority.

The “system” to be maintained is actually so abstract it is arbitrary, which is what Objectivists argue.

With the risk of loss fully assumed at the real negative rate, the Fed has to change objective reality. This quantitative symmetry of the risk value (that I write about and refer to as ECV-symmetry) is what classical economists referred to as “the declining rate of profit.”

The declining rate is a descriptive term derived from observation of a natural condition.

Capitalists noticed that the profit tends to decline over time. It happens by default. To change this it is necessary to derive means that resist the naturally occurring risk, and Objectivists call this “objective reality” and “natural identity.”

At the real, negative rate, money is forced (coerced by equivalence) into “chasing yield.” This forces equity values up, and it has nothing to do with President Trump. However, it does have a lot to do with President Obama’s administration.

President Obama started out with a Democratic-Party Congress and the first thing they did was create a regressive tax burden to fund the SCHIP program, which is now going to be cut. Regressing the tax burden, especially during an historically bad deflationary trend, is neither progressive or populist, but this “party” was, and still is, referred to as progressive and populist.

Throughout the Obama administration, the financial engineering that caused the Great Recession was allowed to persist. The harm being done by TBTF banks, like Bank of America, resulted in record profits, and Steven Mnuchin, for example, got rich turning the misery of others into his personal gain, during the Obama years.

False populist progressivism is exactly what conservatives want. Now the Fed is looking to normalize rates and disambiguate the argument with a risk-free rate that is really free of probable loss.

The Fed is changing things, but it is acting to conserve the accumulation of the losses in the form of risk-free, financial assets. That includes protecting the capital gained from being taxed by the Sovereign power, which is me and you, to confirm what the natural identity of the capital actually is at the real, normal rate by default.

(We can argue that the Fed’s intent to raise rates, correlated with a massive rise in debt, due to tax cuts at the top, is ambiguous. The Fed does not concern itself with fiscal policy, but it can correlate monetary policy with it, due to rising demand, which causes inflation. There is no “coincidence” by chance alone because there is a causal relationship, which has an Equivalent Coercive Value, existing on demand to disambiguate the argument and reveal the preference, or motive, inherent to managing the fully assumed risk.)

Naturally, there is the incentive to tax the accumulated gains and realize, like populists say, a measurable benefit for everybody.

Without ambiguity, the risk of loss is fully assumed in priority, integrally valued, and empirically verified, “even” at the risk-free rate of return.

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